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Research in moral psychology has focused on understanding what factors assist in
the development of moral action and decision making. Examples of these research
factors include educational experiences (Rest et al, 1986), intelligence (Rest, 1979), and
social networking (Derryberry & Thoma, 2000). Personality factors facilitating moral
judgment have also receive attention in recent years with Damon and Hart (1988)
exploring self-understanding as a possible factor in moral judgment and Baumeister and
Exline (1999) proposing that exercising self-control is often characteristic of those who
often employ prosocial behavior. Pizarro (2000) suggested that those who fail to utilize
empathy may think about moral issues just as those who do employ empathy but find
them easier to ignore. This study attempted to explore this research from a different
angle by examining the relationships between antisocial personality traits as opposed to
prosocial personality traits. To measure these traits, data were collected from two
samples comprised of 120 college students and 24 prisoners from a state-inmate facility.
The Defining Issues Test (DIT) was used to measure moral judgment and the Personality
Assessment Inventory (PAI) was used to measure the desired personality factors. The
results indicated that antisocial personality characteristics do not inhibit moral judgment
development. However, the results showed that individuals with antisocial personality
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characteristics were more likely to endorse self-serving decisions in situations that call
for moral decision-making.

vii

Introduction
Moral Judgment Development: An Overview
“The function of morality is to provide a basic guideline for determining how
conflicts in human interests are to be settled and for optimizing mutual benefit of people
living together in groups” (Rest, Deemer, Barnett, Spickemier, & Volker, 1986, p.1).
Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory on moral development is considered a key paradigm for
research in moral psychology. His original view stated that an individual’s moral
functioning operates under one of three primary levels divided into two stages per level
(Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Kohlberg, 1958). His first level, defined as the
preconventional level, represents the stage where one’s moral reasoning centers on how
he/she will be directly affected by the consequences of decisions. Individuals functioning
at this level will operate with a reasoning level oriented towards a reward-punishment
mentality (stage 1) or “you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours” mentality (stage 2)
(Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Kohlberg, 1958).
The next level Kohlberg proposed under which individuals operate is the
conventional level. Stage 3 of this level is defined by a mutual interpersonal expectation
of relationships and interpersonal conformity. Individuals operating under this stage
attempt to perform the right actions because they feel that the majority of society expects
them to and that so doing earns the approval of important others. In stage 4, individuals
begin placing emphasis on the social system and their conscience. In other words, they
begin conforming to the laws of society because they believe those are the infallible
standards.
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Kohlberg’s last proposed level is known as the postconventional level. When
individuals achieve stage 5 of this level, their moral thinking becomes focused more on
individual rights as specified in social contracts. They become aware of the relativity of
group values, but respect non-relative values regardless of majority opinion. Finally, in
stage 6, individuals develop a perspective that revolves around universal ethical
principles. Ultimately, they integrate a sense of willingness to follow self-chosen
principles even if so doing results in violations of the law.
There has always been controversy on whether or not Kohlberg contributed to a
strong foundation for the views on moral judgment. His theory has been criticized for
being too narrow (not representing the whole domain), too similar to Piaget’s theory of
cognitive development, and more a measure of verbal ability (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, &
Thoma, 1999b). According to Rest et al. (1999b), some have even suggested restarting
the field from scratch rather than building on Kohlberg’s theories. However, believing
that his theories still lend credibility but require modification, Rest et al. (1999b)
proposed a neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral thinking to offer answers to criticisms of
Kohlberg’s theory. The approach redefines Kohlberg’s moral stages, but maintains his
core concepts. Core concepts that the neo-Kohlbergian approach endorses include the
emphasis on rationality, the idea that individuals self-construct their categories of
morality, that moral thinking develops, and that individuals shift from conventional moral
thinking to postconventional thinking.
In advancing neo-Kohlbergian theory, Rest (see Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma,
1999a) developed the Defining Issues Test (DIT; discussed in more detail below), which
is an objective measurement of moral judgment with validated response items designed to
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activate particular moral judgment developmental schema. These include the personal
interest, maintaining norms, and postconventional schema. For Rest, moral judgment
development is the product of the advancement along these three schemata such that
reasoning from a specific schema is typically modal, though any schema can be activated.
As such, Rest’s conception of moral judgment development is more of a soft-stage
approach paralleling contemporary views on human development that allows for more
flexibility in moral reasoning throughout the life course as opposed to the hard-stage
notion (e.g., moral judgment is fixed at a specific stage) that Kohlberg advocated.
Rest et al. (1999a) cited the DIT as measuring and confirming Rest’s schema
theory as a result of its ability to reliably distinguish between conventional and
postconventional thinking along with earlier forms of moral thinking (1999a). In
comparison to Kohlberg’s stage theory, the personal interest schema pulls elements from
stage 2 and 3 of moral development, commonly viewed as the beginning stages for
children (Rest et al., 1999a). In other words, individuals who operate under the personal
interest schema are those who endorse a system that follows punishment, obedience, and
the actions that will serve one’s personal interest. Because DIT research is done with
participants 12 years or older, there is little to say about the personal interest schema
relative to the other two schemas.
Kohlberg viewed individuals who operated under stages 3 and 4 of his theory as
ones who place law and order as the greatest priority. Rest designed the maintaining
norms schema as an alternative to Kohlberg’s stage 4. This schema is made up of many
components. Individuals operating under this schema present a “need for norms.” As
Rest et al. (1999a) maintain, society must have a set of norms and standards for
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cooperation among individuals. Individuals do not need to just cooperate with
individuals they know and are familiar with; there also needs to be a mutual
understanding between strangers who come face-to-face. Implementing official laws to
regulate these encounters establishes this society-wide scope of cooperation. These laws
make up a uniform, categorical application known to everyone. The law is set up so that
no matter how individuals understand it, they are both protected by it as well as obligated
to follow it. The law also sets up partial reciprocity where people obey the law and
expect that others are doing the same. Through this system, the society in general will
benefit from everyone’s mutual labor of doing their duty. Rest et al. (1999a) called this a
partial reciprocity as opposed to a “full” reciprocity because obeying the law under the
maintaining norms schema may not serve every individual equally.
The last component of the maintaining norms schema relates to the duty
orientation that individuals feel for a social system. Those who operate under the
maintaining norms schema follow the laws of society rigidly because that is what defines
morality for them. Rest et al. (1999a) stated that “one must obey authorities, not
necessarily out of respect for the personal qualities of the authority, but out of respect for
the social system” (p. 306). In essence, individuals define their morality through the
order and law of society. It is through this belief system that these individuals will
oppose anyone who threatens the social order and, ultimately, their perceived morality.
At the peak of moral judgment is the postconventional schema. Rest et al. (1999a)
defined postconventional thinking as a group of ideals that individuals share for the
cooperation of society and that those ideals are modifiable through debate, tests of logical
consistency, mutual acceptance, and the personal experience of those involved in the
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community. As with the maintaining norms schema, the postconventional schema is
made up of four elements of reference. The first element is related to the primacy of
moral criteria in which an individual realizes that the standards of society are arranged in
a fashion that stipulates the way those under those standards are to behave. However, the
postconventional thinker also realizes that there are exceptions to the proposed norms and
that just because it requires that people behave a certain way does not mean that it is
moral for a person to behave that way. At the postconventional level, individuals see the
laws and standards as modifiable and negotiable when they are not serving the best
interest of the community (Rest et al., 1999a).
The second element is that these thinkers are appealing to an ideal. In other
words, postconventional thinking aspires to achieve goals that create the greatest good for
all. Rest et al. (1999a) use examples such as guaranteeing minimal rights and protection
for everyone, engendering caring and intimacy among people, fair treatment, providing
for the needy, furthering the common good, and actualizing personhood to demonstrate
that a postconventional thinker is not merely an individual who is opposing the current
system’s establishment. The third element of postconventional thinkers is the shareable
ideals that they hold. Instead of a personal intuition or ethnocentric preference, these
individuals justify their acts by arguing that their behavior furthers the cooperation, the
common good, and that their acts respect others. Postconventional thinkers behave in
such a way that is selfless because they view their behavior as promoting the overall
well-being of everyone.
The last element is known as full reciprocity. Partial reciprocity of the
maintaining norms schema proposed that society will work if everyone abides by the law.
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However, the postconventional thinker realizes the possibility of a subjective law that
favors certain individuals over others. Hence, the individual under this schema argues
that certain laws should be modified to provide equality among all individuals (Rest et al.,
1999).
The DIT
The Moral Judgment Interview (MJI; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) was Kohlberg’s
primary means for assessing moral judgment development. With the MJI, participants
are presented with several moral dilemmas, asked to solve them, and then asked to
provide an explanation for the reasoning behind their choices. These interviews were
transcribed then scored for a stage using a scoring guide of over 800 pages (Rest et al.,
1999a). As this description implies, scoring the interview material of the MJI is arduous.
Hence, the DIT’s multiple choice method of assessment was developed as a viable
alternative, despite reservations from Kohlberg that rankings and ratings from
participants were a “quick and dirty” technique that was too good to be true (Rest et al.,
1999a, p. 295). For researchers like Kohlberg, the interview method was considered the
primary assessment tool for understanding an individual’s moral mind. Kohlberg
assumed that individuals were perfectly aware of their own inner processes and would
therefore be able to verbally explain them. However, this method of moral assessment
became questioned more and more over time (Rest et al., 1999a). For example,
researchers began to note the fallibility of self-report explanations pertaining to one’s
own cognitive processes. Although it was noted that Kohlberg referred to the scoring
procedure of his interviews as error-free, reports on participants’ responses indicated their
responses could mirror the background of the scorer. For example, based on the
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individual responsible for scoring interviews, some participants tended to sound like the
philosopher John Rawls under Kohlberg, while others sounded like gender feminists
under Carol Gilligan.
In citing the need for a different means for assessing moral reasoning, Rest (see
Rest et al., 1999a) argued that individuals are able to adequately report on the products of
their cognition but less so on the mental operations they utilized to arrive at their
conclusion. The logic behind the development of the DIT, therefore, presumes a
recognition task is much simpler in that individuals only discriminate between lines of
reasoning versus producing a unique line of reasoning (Rest et al., 1999a). One problem
with Kohlberg’s research is postconventional thinking has rarely been scored. Little
evidence exists to support his stage 5 scoring, and Kohlberg himself even eliminated
stage 6 from scoring due to lack of empirical evidence. This was considered by many to
be a serious problem for his theory (Rest et al., 1999a). However, the DIT recognition
tasks appear to have eliminated this problem, showing more instances scored at the
postconventional level.
The procedure to follow for individuals taking the DIT is straightforward.
Participants read six scenarios, each containing an individual faced with a moral dilemma.
The individuals are then asked to respond, or make an action choice, which measures
their level of moral judgment. Participants’ choices are limited to whether they feel the
individual in the scenario should act on the situation, not act on the situation, or whether
they are unable to decide. The next step for participants is to read a list of 12 issues
related to the dilemma and indicate on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = great importance, 5 = no
importance) how relevant each statement is to the choice the character makes in each
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hypothetical scenario. Finally, participants are asked to rank the four items in each
dilemma that they consider most important in making their action choice. These ratings
and rankings provide insight into which schema (personal interest, maintaining norms, or
postconventional) participants are primarily operating under.
To quantify each domain the DIT measures, many indices have been researched
over time. For over 20 years, individuals relied on the P score to measure an individual’s
moral development. The P score references the number of times an individual ranks
postconventional items as most important and, therefore, measures the extent to which an
individual demonstrates postconventional reasoning in their responses. However,
research indicated two significant flaws with this index (Rest, Thoma, Narvaez, &
Bebeau, 1997). The first suggested that assigning numbers to Kohlbergian views created
a quantitative vs. qualitative issue while the second indicated that because information
from lower stage items was not used, the P score would ultimately throw away data. Rest
et al. (1997) compared the P index to the newer N2 index and found that N2
outperformed P on multiple domains. The N2 index is similar to the P score in that it
measures the degree to which P items are prioritized. However, in accounting for an
individual’s rating of all items, it also contains another component that measures the
degree to which the lower stages are rated lower than the ratings of the higher stages
(Rest et al., 1997). As with the P score, the N2 score will be higher for individuals who
respond to DIT items related to postconventional thinking. Unlike the P score, however,
the N2 score accounts for the participant’s rating of other items. Thus, those who rate
items related to the postconventional schema highly and minimize their ratings of items
pertaining to the other two schemata have the highest N2 scores.
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The Type index, which has been developed to compensate for N2’s lack of
information about the extent of schema mixture, scores group participants on two
common characteristics: a) modal moral judgment schema and b) the extent of schema
mix (Rest et al., 1999a). Seven developmental types are noted and split into two
categories: consolidated and transitional. Individuals of consolidated types will utilize a
point of view that is consistent with the predominant schema, whereas those of
transitional types will utilize contending views from more than one schema. Types 1, 4,
and 7 are defined as consolidated types. Hence, the personal interest schema is not only
modal at type 1 but is also clearly preferred over the other two schemata; the maintaining
norms schema is not only modal at type 4 but is also clearly preferred over the other two
schemata; and the postconventional schema is not only modal at type 7 but is also clearly
preferred over the other two schemata. Types 2, 3, 5, and 6 are defined as the transitional
types. Although a moral judgment schema is modal for these types, the preference of a
specific schema is not as strong among these types as is the case for consolidated types.
At type 2, the individual is transitioning away from the personal interest moral judgment
schema. At type 3, the maintaining norms schema has become modal though the
influence of the personal interest schema is still apparent. The maintaining norms
schema is still modal at type 5, but it is evident that the individual is starting to transition
away from this schema as reference of items pertaining to the postconventional schema is
increasing. At type 6, the modal schema is the postconventional schema but the influence
of items pertaining to the maintaining norms schema remains.
Rest et al. (1999a) also describe other indices of importance used in the
quantification of DIT information. These are noted as the Number of Can’t Decides
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(NUMCD), the Utilizer score (U), the Humanitarian/Liberal Perspective (HUMLIB),
Religious Orthodoxy (ORTHO), and Antiestablishment (A). The NUMCD is essentially
a count of the number of times a participant reports he/she can’t decide on which action
to take. The U score is a measure of the degree of fit between the importance ratings of
items and advocacy of action. The HUMLIB variable is in place to indicate how many
times a participant’s response is consistent with those in the highest scoring groups
(professionals in political science and philosophy) (Thoma, 2006). ORTHO is an index
designed to measure the amount a participant utilizes reasoning according to religious
orthodoxy. The ORTHO index is in place to represent the sum of both the rates and
ranks for Item 9 in the Doctor’s Dilemma (note: Item 9 relates to the idea that only God
can determine who should live and die). The A score is the sum of the rating of items
reflecting an antiestablishment attitude. As Rest (1993) notes, “These considerations
presuppose an understanding of Stage 4, but fault existing authorities and ‘the
establishment’ for being hypocritical and inconsistent with its own rationale. The ‘A’
point of view is critical but offers nothing positive in its place” (p. 12).
Factors Facilitating Moral Judgment
Over the years, research has identified a variety of factors that influence and
contribute to the development of moral judgment such as educational experiences (Rest et
al, 1986), intelligence (Rest, 1979), and social networking (Derryberry & Thoma, 2000).
One area that has received increased attention in recent years is personality and aspects of
self that pertain to or contribute to personality. A variety of research has emerged which
focuses on aspects of personality that appear to be positively correlated with moral
judgment development. For example, results from a longitudinal design on the existence
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of a prosocial personality by Eisenberg, Guthrie, and Cumberland (2002) indicated that
self-reported prosocial dispositions and prosocial moral reasoning on an objective
measure of moral judgment were positively related to prosocial behavior when the
participants were observed as preschoolers. In another study, Wilson (1983) found that
those who were rated at the highest stages of Kohlberg’s moral judgment rated highest on
values such as Self-Respect, Mature Love, Logical, Independent, and Inner Harmony of
the Rokeach Value Survey and those at the pre-conventional stages were associated with
the hedonistic values. In a study on the perceived personality of moral exemplars,
Walker (1999) utilized the template for the Factor Five model (Costa & McCrae, 1992;
Goldberg, 1993) to describe the perceived personality characteristics of moral exemplars
(e.g., those advanced in components pertaining to advanced moral development including
moral judgment). The results indicated that personality traits related to
Conscientiousness and Agreeableness were salient for moral exemplars. In exploring
older men and women, Lifton (1985) found that their moral judgment development was
related to personality characteristics associated with the development of mature, balanced,
and symbiotic senses of self and social identity.
Aspects of self that pertain to or contribute to personality that have been explored
in trying to account for moral judgment development include self-control, selfunderstanding, and emotionality. Baumeister and Exline (1999) examined research on
morality and suggested that self-control operates as a “moral muscle” and is vulnerable to
fatigue over time (p.1177). According to Baumeister and Exline, poor self-control is
associated with individuals who make judgments that lead to socially unacceptable
behavior, whereas those who make judgments pertaining to prosocial behavior may
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possess higher self control. Damon and Hart (1988) indicated that individuals develop
self-understanding over time, causing the individual to choose important philosophical or
moral belief systems, ideological choices, and personal goals. Ultimately, this contributes
to the ability to form moral ideals and beliefs. Lastly, Pizarro (2000) suggested that an
empathic emotional response works as a “moral signal” in making everyday moral
judgments. In other words, although individuals without empathy are not precluded from
moral reasoning and judgments, they can be inhibited in recognizing moral situations or
may find it easy to ignore recognized situations calling for moral action (Pizarro).
Statement of the Problem and Purpose of the Study
Research demonstrates the relationship that certain personality factors have with
advanced moral judgment development. However, there are some aspects of personality
that could negatively relate or work contrary to moral judgment development. For
example, it is plausible to hypothesize that certain personality characteristics pertaining to
anti-social behavior (specifically anti-social personality traits as defined by the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-4th Edition -Text Revised, 2000,
discussed later) could relate to an individual’s failure to either advance in or utilize his or
her moral judgment development. To date, moral judgment research has yet to examine
this possibility. Thus, the following research question is presented: How do antisocial
personality characteristics relate to moral judgment development? In asking this
question, the goal of the study is to determine if there is inferential evidence supporting
that certain aspects pertaining to personality could undermine moral judgment
development.
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As noted previously, there are a variety of personality characteristics and factors
related to personality that have positive relationships with moral judgment development.
At the same time, just as aspects of personality may serve to facilitate moral judgment
development, other aspects of personality could be a detriment to moral judgment
development. If one observes the DSM-IV-TR criteria for Antisocial Personality
Disorder, there appear to be personality traits and behaviors that are quite the opposite of
what is considered moral aptitude and behavior. Currently, the diagnostic criteria for
Antisocial Personality Disorder include “a pervasive pattern of disregard for the rights of
others that begins in childhood and early adolescence and continues into adulthood”
(DSM-IV-TR, 2000, p. 701). Antisocial Personality Disorder falls under Cluster B (also
known as the emotional, dramatic, and erratic disorders) of the Personality Disorders. At
the center of this personality is a pattern of deceit and manipulation for self-serving
reasons. Though the diagnosis of this personality disorder is only given to individuals 18
and above, children who display the same behaviors are diagnosed with Conduct
Disorder (DSM-IV-TR, 2000).
From a Neo-Kohlbergian point of view, individuals manifesting behaviors leading
to the diagnosis of Antisocial Personality or Conduct Disorder would be expected to be
operating according to the personal interest schema. Those who are diagnosed with
Antisocial Personality Disorder usually fail to conform to the norms and laws of society
and have no problem breaking laws, such as destroying property the property of others,
stealing, and becoming involved with illegal operations. For unexplained reasons, it
appears that these individuals fail either to a) advance in their moral judgment
development or b) utilize their moral judgment ability. In their interactions with other
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individuals, those with this disorder fail to show any regard for the feelings, rights, and
wishes of the other. Instead, they manipulate and deceive these individuals for the sole
purpose of obtaining some personal gain such as money or sex (DSM-IV-TR, 2000).
They are also likely to engage in physical fights and perform acts of assault on other
individuals. It is also likely that individuals with this disorder are involved in spouse and
child beatings (DSM-IV-TR, 2000). Individuals with Antisocial Personality Disorder act
very impulsively and make decisions without considering how it might affect those
around them (such as changing jobs or relationships quickly, DSM-IV-TR, 2000).
Financially, they are irresponsible and they often engage in reckless behavior that will
likely bring harmful consequences. Upon creating harm in the lives of other individuals,
they will often respond with an indifferent attitude and make apathetic statements such as
“life’s unfair” and “they had it coming.” They will usually attempt to justify their actions
by blaming the victim for being helpless and deserving of what was coming. Individuals
with Antisocial Personality Disorder have a very self-centered perspective and explain
that the only person they will help is “number one” (DSM-IV-TR, 2000)
Individuals with Antisocial Personality Disorder are generally described as
“psychopaths” and “sociopaths.” Many of them have a very arrogant and inflated sense
of the self and feel that the things most people do are “below them.” The infamous Ted
Bundy is a classic example of this description. His noted lack of empathy towards his
victims and inflated ego as he defended himself during his murder trial were key
components in his criminality. Generally, those who are diagnosed with Antisocial
Personality Disorder are described as having a lack of empathy, inflated self-appraisal,
superficial charm, and a complete disregard for social norms. They are typically very
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poor parents and caretakers and generally leave those they are responsible for helpless.
For example, a child may become malnourished or an elder’s needs may become
neglected (DSM-IV-TR, 2000).
Given what we understand about moral judgment development, it is possible to
predict that there are personality factors associated with Antisocial Personality Disorder
that could relate to an individual’s failure to either advance in or utilize his or her moral
judgment development. Therefore, the purpose of the present study is to examine how
characteristics similar to the traits described in Antisocial Personality Disorder may relate
to the a) result in a failure to advance in moral judgment development and b) failure to
utilize one’s moral judgment ability. In exploring the first possibility, antisocial
personality characteristics are compared to DIT N2 and Type scores. Significant
negative relationships will be required in order to infer that antisocial personality
characteristics are linked to detriments in moral judgment development. In exploring the
second scenario, antisocial personality characteristics will be compared to DIT U,
ORTHO, HUMLIB, NUMCD, and A scores. Affirmation of this second possibility will
require significant negative relationships among antisocial personality characteristics and
U, ORTHO, and HUMLIB; a negligible relationship with NUMCD scores; and a positive
significant relationship with A scores.

Method
Participants
College Students. Participants included 120 college students who volunteered
through the Department of Psychology’s Study Board at a large Southeastern regional
public comprehensive university. College students were offered extra-credit as incentive
for completing the research. The sample of college students excluded 13 participants due
to failure to pass reliability checks or failure to complete the measures fully. Of the
sample, 32 identified their gender as male and 75 identified their gender as female. Of
those who identified their class year, 78 indicated freshman, 15 indicated sophomore,
nine reported junior, four reported senior, and one reported other. In terms of ethnicity,
89 classified themselves as white, 10 as black, three as Hispanic, three as other, and two
as Indian. The average age of the sample was 19.36 years (SD = 2.86).
Prisoners. Participants also included 24 prisoners, part of a state-inmate program,
who volunteered to contribute to the research. However, 17 failed to pass reliability
checks or did not complete the measures in full. Hence, only data from seven
participants were included in the final sample. Of these seven participants, two reported
that their gender was male, and five reported that their gender was female. In regards to
ethnicity, six reported themselves to be white and one indicated black. The average age of
the sample was 35.14 years (SD = 8.15).
Measures
Demographics questionnaire. Participants were asked to indicate their age,
gender, grade point average (GPA), ACT score, education level, and ethnicity.
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Personality Measure. Individuals completed a personality measure known as the
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 1991). On the PAI, participants read
statements and respond to how accurately each statement describes their personality. In
responding to each item, participants have five response choices: Strongly Agree, Agree,
Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. The PAI is designed to measure a variety of
clinical variables. Such clinical variables include Depression (DEP), Anxiety (ANX),
Mania (MAN), Paranoia (PAR), Schizophrenia (SCZ), and features of Axis II disorders
such as Borderline Personality Disorder (BOR), and Antisocial Personality Disorder
(ANT). Given that the focus of the current study is on the correlation between moral
judgment development and antisocial personality factors, scores on the PAI’s Antisocial
Features scale (ANT) and its designated subscales are the focus of the study.
Once an individual’s raw score has been calculated for each PAI subscale, it is
then translated into a T-score. T-scores of 50 to 69 are considered within normal range
and represent the population who displays specific traits of the feature, but not enough to
warrant clinical significance. T-scores below 50 represent populations who display little
or no characteristics. Finally, T-scores 70 and above are considered clinically significant
and suggest that individuals in this range display multiple symptoms characteristic of the
specific clinical variable.
The ANT scale of the PAI is comprised of three subscales of 8 items each which
tap into different facets of antisocial personality. The first subscale, known as Antisocial
Behaviors (ANTA), will be elevated for individuals who have a history of antisocial acts
and have been involved in illegal activities such as theft, destruction of property, and
physical aggression. These individuals have often manifested Conduct Disorder during
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adolescence. The PAI measures traits on this scale from responses to statements such as
“I like to see how much I can get away with” and “I’ve never taken money or property
that wasn’t mine.”
The second subscale, Ego-centric (ANTE), is elevated for individuals who display
little regard for others. They can be described as individuals who take advantage of
others and feel little responsibility for the property of others. They are also unlikely to
feel any remorse for past transgressions and place little importance on their role as spouse,
parent, or employee. Responses to statements such as “I’ve borrowed money without
paying it back” and “I’ll take advantage of others if they leave themselves open to it”
indicate an individual’s level of ego-centricity.
Finally, Stimulus-Seeking (ANTS) represents individuals who manifest behavior
in a manner that is dangerous to both themselves and/or those around them. These
individuals also crave excitement and are easily bored by routine and convention. This
scale is measured by the responses to statements such as “I get a kick out of doing
dangerous things” and “I do a lot of wild things just for the thrill of it.” It should be
noted that individuals must be elevated (T score >70) on at least two of the three stated
subscales for a diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder to be considered.
Development of the PAI generated descriptive statistics from three different
samples: Census-matched standardization, College, and Clinical. The Census-matched
standardization sample (N = 1,000) acquired a M = 4.99 (T score = 50) and a SD = 4.42
(T score = 48) for the ANT-A subscale, a M = 3.43 (T score = 49) and a SD = 3.01 (T
score = 49) for the ANT-E subscale, and a M = 4.74 (T score = 51) and SD = 3.66 (T
score = 48) for the ANT-S subscale. The college sample (N = 1,051) acquired a M = 6.34
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(T score = 49) and SD = 4.71 (T score = 47) for the ANT-A subscale, a M = 4.97 (T score
= 50) and SD = 3.16 (T score = 44) for the ANT-E scale, and a M = 7.61 (T score = 51)
and SD = 4.35 (T score = 42) for the ANT-S scale. Finally, the clinical sample (N =
1,265) patients acquired a M = 8.31 (T score = 49) and SD = 5.80 (T score = 44) on the
ANT-A subscale, a M = 4.46 (T score = 49) and SD = 3.45 (T score = 46) on the ANT-E
subscale, and a M = 6.10 (T score = 50) and SD = 4.52 (T score = 48) on the ANT-S
subscale (Morey, 1991). Though the data for the sample were standardized using Tscores, the current study will run analyses using raw scores because it is a non-clinical
sample.
According to Morey (1991), the internal consistency for the ANT-A subscale
generated an α = .73 for the census sample, α = .76 for the college sample, and α = .80 for
clinical sample. For the ANT-E, the results indicated an α = .63 for all three samples.
Finally, the ANT-S resulted in an α = .69 for the census sample, α = .77 for the college
sample, and α = .75 for the clinical sample. Test-retest reliability coefficients for the
combined samples of community and college yielded r = .83 for the ANT-A subscale, r
= .75 for the ANT-E subscale, and r = .85 for the ANT-S subscale (Morey). For the
present study, the college sample yielded an α = .74 for the ANTA, α = .60 for ANTE,
and an α = .70 for ANTS.
Moral Judgment: The Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, &
Thoma, 1999) was used to assess participants’ moral judgment. The DIT is a measure
administered in multiple-choice format that presents six moral dilemmas for a main
character. The participants are asked to indicate the action choice they feel is most
appropriate for the main character. The response choices indicate whether or not the
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character should act on the situation or if the participant is unable to decide on the proper
choice. The participant is then faced with 12 issues related to each dilemma and asked to
rate each issue or statement on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = great importance, 5 = no importance)
in terms of its importance to the decision made about the main character. The projected
indices to measure will be those previously discussed, which are N2, Type, U, HUMLIB,
ORTHO, and A. Scores for the N2 index range from 0 to 95, with scores towards the
higher end indicating a tendency to make decisions under the postconventional schema.
The Type index ranges from 1 to 7.
Types 1 and 2 are modal at the personal interest schema; Types 3, 4, and 5 are
modal at the maintaining norms schema; and Types 6 and 7 are modal at the
postconventional schema. Types 1, 4, and 7 represent consolidated phases of moral
judgment development while Types 2, 3, 5, and 6 represent transitional phases of moral
judgment development (see the earlier discussion of Type index). The scores for the U
index range from -1 to 1. Scores closer to 1 indicate a greater likelihood of the utilization
of the modal moral judgment schema. Scores for HUMLIB range from 0 (no matches) to
6 (all matches). ORTHO scores include a range from 1 (lowest) to 9 (highest). Finally,
A scores range from 5 to 25, with higher scores indicative of antiestablishment attitudes.
Rest et al. (1999a) indicated that the test-retest reliability for the DIT has been
reported to range from r = .70 to r = .80. Depending on the index, Cronbach’s alpha for
the DIT has ranged from the high .70’s to the low .80’s for the past 20 years, which is
considered adequate (Rest et al., 1999). In evaluating the internal consistency of the DIT
in the current study, Cronbach’s α’s were computed at the item-level for each schema
(e.g., consideration of the consistency across DIT rating items specific to particular moral
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judgment schema), as Crowson, DeBacker, Derryberry, and Thoma (2006) recently
recommended. For the present study, internal consistency is low to acceptable at each
schema, with α = .81 for the postconventional schema, α = .52 for the maintaining norms
schema, and α = .76 for the personal interest schema.
Procedure
Participants from the college sample volunteered to be a part of the study via the
department’s online study board. Participants from the prisoner sample volunteered after
the researcher contacted the inmate facility’s state-inmate program coordinator. College
students were administered the measurements in a college classroom at different times of
the day.
Before attempting to gather data from a prisoner population, the state-inmate
facility with the desired population was contacted. The chief jailor’s assistant indicated
that the prisoners would be asked if they would be willing to volunteer their free time to
participate in a psychological study. The prisoners were offered no incentive to
participate and were told that they would be allowed to quit anytime they wished.
Prisoners were gathered as a group into a conference room in the county jail to be
administered their portion of the assessment. At the beginning of each session the
researcher thoroughly explained the procedure. Participants then read and signed an
informed consent document explaining the procedure prior to the administration of the
preceding measurements. Participants first completed a copy of the DIT to assess for
their level of moral judgment. Participants then completed the PAI to assess their clinical
personality characteristics. When completed, the participants turned in their responses to
the researcher. Data from each participant were placed in a folder and designated a
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number. Informed consent documents were separated from their data to ensure
anonymity.

Results
Descriptive information for the college students, prisoners, and those with
clinically elevated PAI scores can be found in Table 1. In terms of DIT scores, no major
anomalies or unexpected occurrences were present in the college student sample. It is
interesting to note that those scoring in the “clinically elevated” range of the antisocial
scale had similar means and standard deviations, relative to both the college and prisoner
sample, on both the developmental and non-developmental DIT indices. DIT Type and
N2 scores indicate that both the college students and the prisoners were modal at the
maintaining norms schema. Though both were similar in terms of their modal moral
judgment schema, it is interesting to note that DIT Type scores support that the college
students were consolidated upon the maintaining norms schema, whereas the prisoners
were transitioning towards the maintaining norms schema (Rest, 1993, Rest et al.,1999a
Thoma, 2006). DIT NUMCD score means suggest that participants were decisive in their
action choices and had minimal difficulty in deciding upon an action choice. The low
DIT HUMLIB means denote that the action choice responses of most participants in the
sample were not reflective of the humanitarian/liberal perspective on moral issues and are
typical of those with conventional Type scores (i.e., 3 to 5; Thoma, 2006). DIT ORTHO
means reflect a moderate influence of religious orthodoxy in moral decision making
among most participants. DIT U score means support that the action choices and ratings
of the majority of the sample were neither predominantly consistent nor inconsistent.
DIT A score means indicate that antiestablishment attitudes for most in the sample were
low, though it is interesting to note that the A scores of the prisoners were advanced
relative to the college students.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of the Participants

Index

College Students

Prisoners

Clinically Elevated

(N =107 )
M
SD

(N =7 )
M
SD

(N = 8)
M

SD

Type

4.19

1.80

3.14

1.68

4.75

1.91

NUMCD

1.03

.94

1.00

.00

1.13

.99

HUMLIB

2.67

1.25

2.43

.79

3.13

1.36

ORTHO

5.76

2.88

5.29

2.21

6.13

3.60

U

.16

.14

.03

.09

.16

.14

N2

32.71

13.27

21.30

8.75

31.36

15.62

A

1.73

2.36

3.00

2.31

3.88

3.76

ANTA

5.31

4.49

11.29

3.59

15.13

3.94

ANTE

4.31

3.10

3.86

3.39

9.86

2.90

ANTS

6.43

3.92

10.57

6.16

14.75

3.92

Note: Type = Defining Issues Test (DIT) index of schema and developmental phase, NUMCD = DIT
Number of Can’t Decides scores, ORTHO = DIT Religious/Orthodoxy scores, U = DIT Utilitarianism
scores, N2 = DIT Developmental scores, A = DIT Antisocial scores, ANTA = PAI Antisocial: Antisocial
Behavior subscale score, ANTE = PAI Antisocial: Egocentricity subscale score, ANTS = PAI Antisocial:
Stimulation seeking subscale score.

For PAI ANT indices, the clinically elevated sample falls within the normal range
of the ANT subscale scores. The ANT subscale data also appears within the normal
expected range for college students taking the PAI. Mean scores for the prisoner
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participants appear within the normal range for the ANTE subscale, but appear slightly
elevated for both the ANTA and ANTS subscales (Morey, 1991).
Table 2
Correlations among DIT and PAI scores
Type

NUMCD

HUMLIB

ORTHO

U

Type

1.00

NUMCD

.031

1.00

HUMLIB

.099

-.323**

ORTHO

-.268**

-.008

-.334**

1.00

U

.039

-.088

.054

.105

1.00

N2

.756**

-.097

.176

-.189

.267**

A

.166

-.116

.210*

-.394**

-.052

ANTA

.075

-.013

.181

-.095

.066

ANTE

.061

-.009

.228**

-.222*

.225**

ANTS

.077

.130

.196

-.131

-.064

1.00
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Table 2 (continued)
N2

A

ANTa

ANTe

N2

1.00

A

.100

1.00

ANTA

.114

.329**

1.00

ANTE

-.011

.217*

.410**

1.00

ANTS

-.049

.223**

.434**

.498**

ANTs

1.00

Note: ** Correlation is significant at the .001 level. * Correlation is significant at the .05 level.
Note: Type = Defining Issues Test (DIT) index of schema and developmental phase, NUMCD = DIT
Number of Can’t Decides scores, ORTHO = DIT Religious/Orthodoxy scores, U = DIT Utilitarianism
scores, N2 = DIT Developmental scores, A = DIT Antisocial scores, ANTA = PAI Antisocial: Antisocial
Behavior subscale score, ANTE = PAI Antisocial: Egocentricity subscale score, ANTS = PAI Antisocial:
Stimulation seeking subscale score.

Table 2 addresses correlations among the considered indices among the college
participants. As indicated below, various significant correlations existed. Most
significant correlations were among the DIT indices and among the PAI indices.
However, significant correlations also appear between certain DIT indices and ANT
subscales including, ANTE and HUMLIB, ANTE and ORTHO, ANTA and A, ANTE
and A, ANTS and A, and ANTE and U.
As a result of the various relationships observed in Table 2, regression analyses
were conducted in order to determine the degree to which PAI scores accounted for
variance in each of the considered DIT indices (see Table 3). As Table 3 illustrates,
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there were some instances in which ANT scores accounted for a significant amount of
variance in DIT scores. This was the case for U scores, where both the ANTE and ANTS
subscales provided significant contributions, and A scores, where ANTA subscale was a
significant contributor.
Given the trends observed between U and ANTE scores (see Tables 2 and 3)
variance, additional analyses were conducted among the college students. As noted
earlier, U scores refer to the consistency of action choices in concert with item ratings.
Consequently, this index provides a useful inference for predicting moral behavior (see
Rest, 1993). As also noted earlier, those with high ANTE scores display little regard for
others or the property of others, do not feel remorse for past transgressions, and place
little importance on their role as spouse, parent, or employee. Hence, both of these
indices provide valuable information about participants’ action choices. Therefore, oneway Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) were performed among most of the DIT dilemma
action choices in order to determine if there were statistically significant differences in
ANTE scores. Such analyses were necessary in order to determine if particular action
choices were associated with advanced ANTE scores. Table 4 reveals the findings of
these analyses.
Table 3
Summary of Regression Analyses

Type

B

SE B

β

t

Sig.*

ANTA

.019

.045

.047

.414

.680

ANTE

.010

.068

.018

.152

.880

ANTS

-.022

.054

-.048

-.404

.687
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Table 3 (Continued)
NUMCD

HUMLIB

ORTHO

U

N2

A

ANTA

-.014

.023

-.067

-.598

.551

ANTE

-.025

.035

-.082

-.708

.481

ANTS

.048

.028

.200

1.707

.091

ANTA

.023

.030

.082

.749

.455

ANTE

.061

.046

.152

1.343

.182

ANTS

.027

.037

.085

.741

.460

ANTA

-.002

.571

-.003

.023

.982

ANTE

-.195

.106

-.210

-1.835

.069

ANTS

-.020

.085

-.027

-.236

.814

ANTA

.001

.003

.033

-.303

.762

ANTE

.015

.005

.332

2.941

.004

ANTS

-.009

.004

-.243

-2.141

.035

ANTA

.411

.338

.138

1.215

.227

ANTE

-.379

.507

-.088

-.747

.457

ANTS

-.114

.399

-.034

-.286

.775

ANTA

.142

.056

.270

2.547

.014

ANTE

.054

.084

.071

.644

.521

ANTS

.042

.067

.071

.633

.528

Note: Type = Defining Issues Test (DIT) index of schema and developmental phase, NUMCD = DIT
Number of Can’t Decides scores, ORTHO = DIT Religious/Orthodoxy scores, U = DIT Utilitarianism
scores, N2 = DIT Developmental scores, A = DIT Antisocial scores, ANTA = PAI Antisocial: Antisocial
Behavior subscale score, ANTE = PAI Antisocial: Egocentricity subscale score, ANTS = PAI Antisocial:
Stimulation seeking subscale score. * Bonferroni’s adjustment – p < .007.
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In consideration of the ANTE score choices on Heinz and the Drug action choices,
significant differences were found (F [2, 104] =3.47 p = .035, η2 = .062). A Least
Significant Difference (LSD) post hoc test revealed a difference between those who
chose “Should steal” versus “Should not steal” (p = .016). A Bonferonni post hoc test
also revealed the same thing (p = .048) No significant differences were found for ANTE
scores among the Escaped Prisoner action choices (F [2, 103] = .557, p = .575, η2
= .011). For ANTE scores and the Newspaper action choices, no significant differences
were present (F [2, 104] = 2.33, p = .102, η2 = .043). No significant differences were
seen for ANTE scores among the Doctor’s Dilemma action choices (F [2, 103] = 2.46, p
= .090, η2 = .046). The large majority of participants selected “should hire Mr. Lee” on
the Webster dilemma (See Table 4). Thus, it was not prudent to statistically consider the
differences in ANTE scores among the differing answering choices. It is interesting to
note that ANTE scores were elevated among those that were undecided and those that
selected “should not hire Mr. Lee.” Finally, significant differences were found on
ANTE scores among the Student Take-Over action choices (F [2, 102] = 4.26, p = .017,
η2 = .077). A LSD post hoc test revealed significance between the “Should Take Over”
and the “Should Not Take Over” responses (p = .015). A Bonferroni post hoc test also
revealed a significant difference between the two (.044).
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Table 4
ANTE Scores per Dilemma Action Choice
Should …

Can’t Decide

Should Not …

Mean

SD

N

Mean

SD

N

Mean

SD

N

5.00

3.35

41

4.86

3.14

22

3.39

3.10

44

4.61

3.36

46

3.83

2.79

29

4.35

3.06

31

Newspaper3

3.67

2.43

31

2.71

1.89

7

4.75

3.38

69

Doctor’s

5.29

3.36

31

3.59

2.60

29

4.13

3.15

46

Webster 5

4.11

2.91

98

6.67

3.61

6

9.00

5.66

2

Student

5.69

3.42

16

5.42

3.15

12

3.71

2.74

77

Heinz and
the Drug1
Escaped
Prisoner2

Dilemma4

Take-Over6
Note: 1Should/should not steal the drug; 2 Should/should not report him; : 3 Should/should not allow the
students to publish the articles;

4

Should/should not administer the drug;

Mr. Lee; : 6 Should/should not take over the building.

5

Should/should not have hired

Discussion
In researching the relationship between antisocial personality factors and moral
judgment, it is important to note that no previous research on this topic was found prior to
this study. Thus, this study attempts to set the foundation for future research on similar
topics. The research question this study pursues is: How do antisocial personality
characteristics relate to moral judgment development? The research question at hand
addresses the possibility that just as prosocial personality factors positively relate to
reasoning and judgments on moral dilemmas (Goldberg, 1993; Lifton, 1985, Walker,
1999), the inverse could occur where antisocial personality factors are concerned.
This study relied on bivariate correlations (see Table 2) and regression (see
Table 3) in order to consider how PAI subscales of antisocial personality (i.e., ANTE,
ANTS, and ANTA) related to DIT developmental indices (i.e., Type and N2) and DIT
non-developmental indices (i.e., NUMCD, ORTHO, U, A, and HUMLIB). As Tables 2
and 3 support, no significant relationships emerged between any of the PAI ANT scores
and the DIT developmental indices. In regards to the first hypothesis, this indicates a
possibility that antisocial personality characteristics assessed by the PAI do not inhibit
moral judgment development. In essence, this provides us with a clue as to how these
personality factors pertain to moral judgment. This finding is particularly important
given that the previous research by Goldberg (1993), Lifton (1985), and Walker (1999)
have indicated that prosocial personalities characteristics contribute to moral judgment
development. Therefore, future research may want to further delve into what it is about
prosocial characteristics that advance moral judgment development and account for why
it is that the inverse does not occur with antisocial characteristics.
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Correlations between the non-developmental DIT indices and ANT scores
revealed some significant relationships (See Table 2). Specifically, statistically
significant correlations were found between ANTE scores and the ORTHO, HUMLIB, A,
and U indices. Significant correlations also existed for the ANTS and ANTA subscales
with DIT A scores. In order to determine if ANT scores accounted for a significant
portion of variance for these indices, regression analyses were conducted. Where the
ORTHO index was concerned, ANT subscales did not provide a significant contribution
to variance. Hence, though a significant negative correlation between ANTE and
ORTHO existed, its magnitude was not large enough to result in a significant amount of
shared variance. Therefore, the presence of antisocial personality characteristics are not
enough to statistically predict a decrease in a person utilizing reasoning based on
religious or other culturally influenced ideologies (and vice versa). This finding raises an
interesting possibility. Though the lack of clinically elevated antisocial personalities
make it difficult to predict how this index is influenced by antisocial personality disorder,
it may still be possible that religious cultural ideologies affect the manifestation of
antisocial characteristics in situations where they would otherwise be prevalent. In other
words, participants raised in a highly religious environment may have antisocial
tendencies suppressed in specific situations. Indeed, this possibility is supported by the
biopsychosocial approach, which is an important theoretical explanation of behavioral
problems and abnormal psychology. According to the biopsychosocial approach,
behavioral problems are the product of the interaction of biological, psychological, and
social factors. Hence, it may be that the social influence of religious or other cultural
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ideologies might be enough to prevent biological predispositions towards antisocial
personality from manifesting into individual behavior.
In regards to the HUMLIB index, ANT subscales provided no significant
contribution to variance. It should be noted that the significant correlation between
ANTE and HUMLIB scores was positive, which was counter to what was expected.
Though chance is always a possibility in an unexpected correlation such as this, it is also
possible that those manifesting antisocial personality characteristics may have endorsed
items that those with a humanitarian liberal perspective also endorse but for differing
reasons. One possibility may be that those with elevated characteristics may see some
self-serving interest within items that characterize the humanitarian liberal perspective.
For example, choosing to have Heinz steal the drug can be a result of both a humanitarian
liberal ideology (the preservation of human life) and an tendency towards antisocial
behavior (the druggist deserves to be robbed, my wife has duties she must do for me, etc).
Another possibility may be that, when those with antisocial characteristics see no
opportunity for personal gain, they may rate items that pertain to the humanitarian liberal
perspective as important either by default or due to an exaggerated since of selfimportance.

Regardless of these possibilities, the regression analysis is important to

note because it acknowledges that antisocial personality traits do not statistically predict
the likelihood that participants will endorse the humanitarian liberal perspective, which
supports that those with high ANTE scores are not receptive to all of the items
comprising the humanitarian liberal perspective.
Regression analyses revealed stronger relationships among ANT scores and the
DIT A and U indices. Where DIT A scores were concerned, the ANTA scores
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contributed a significant amount of shared variance. Specifically, the relationship
between the ANTA subscale and the A index indicates that those reporting higher levels
of antisocial behavior were statistically more likely to rate antiestablishment attitudes
regarding social issues as important on the DIT. This finding does not reveal any
surprises as the antiestablishment items are inherently antisocial. Thus, it makes sense
that those reporting higher levels of antisocial behavior would endorse an
antiestablishment attitude.
For DIT U scores, both ANTE and ANTS scores provided significant
contributions to variance. These contributions suggest that antisocial characteristics can
statistically increase the chances that certain action choices will correspond with certain
issues that are advocated or rated as important on the DIT. This also makes sense as
those with Antisocial Personality Disorder are described as those who are more selfserving and have no issue with stealing or vandalizing. For example, in both the Student
Take-Over and Heinz and the Drug dilemmas, there are opportunities to break the law for
various reasons related to both the ANTE (He deserves what he’s getting) and ANTS
(It’ll give me a rush).
The significant positive correlations and betas observed between U and ANTE
scores are recognized as an important finding. As previously stated, the U score is in
place to measure the degree of fit between the importance rating items and the advocacy
of action choices (Rest et al, 1999b). Recall that ANTE scores represent the level of
egocentricity an individual’s personality manifests. In other words, individuals with high
scores on this subscale have often acted without regarding the impact it may have on
others. Since both variables have implications pertaining to moral action, investigation of
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whether specific action choices are associated with increases or decreases in ANTE
scores was warranted. Thus, further analyses involving five one-way ANOVAs were
conducted in order to account for differences in ANTE scores among the differing action
choices for each dilemma (Table 4).
Significant differences in ANTE scores were seen among action choices for the
Heinz and the Drug and Student Take-Over dilemmas. On the Heinz and the Drug
dilemma, LSD post hoc tests revealed that those who responded with “Should Steal the
Drug” had significantly higher ANTE scores than those that responded with “Should Not
Steal the Drug.” On the Student Take-Over dilemma, those who supported “Should Take
Over” had significantly higher ANTE scores than did those who supported “Should Not
Take Over.” The ANTE scores on the action choices for the Webster dilemma should
also be noted. Though it was not possible to address these differences statistically due to
the disparate number of participants that selected “Should hire Mr. Lee,” the results are
consistent with the trends noted on the two previous dilemmas.
It is important to distinguish the nature of the decisions made in these scenarios as
opposed to other scenarios. The action choices in these dilemmas possess the essence of
self-serving opportunities in some form or fashion, whereas the other scenarios are
situations in which no apparent self-serving goal would be served, regardless of the
decision made. For example, in the Heinz and the Drug dilemma, participants may
choose the option “Should Steal the Drug” because they feel that the pharmacist is so
greedy he deserves to be robbed. When describing the personal interest schema, Rest et
al (1999a) stated that individuals operating from this schema may choose “Should Steal
the Drug” because Heinz needs his wife to get better so she can continue to provide her
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necessary duties as a wife for him. In a similar vein, this action choice may be appealing
to those possessing the characteristics that the ANTE score assesses.
In the “Student Take-Over” scenario, self-serving reasons for taking over the
administration building may include thoughts such as, “The president deserves this for
disagreeing with what everyone else thinks,” or even, “This could gain me public
exposure.” Thus, it is plausible to suggest that those with elevated ANTE scores
responded with “Should Steal the Drug” and “Should Take-Over” because making these
decisions would fulfill a specific self-serving purpose. These data, therefore, provide
initial confirmation that those scoring high on ANTE scale will have a tendency to make
self-serving decisions in a situation that calls for moral judgment. In short, this
information provides important clues concerning this study’s research question in that it
offers insight regarding the types of moral decisions that those with elevated antisocial
personality characteristics are likely to make.
Limitations
As with any study, the research involved in this current investigation is not
without its shortcomings. Given the fact that this study explores new domains, drawing
absolute conclusions with the limited data should be cautioned. The primary limitation to
this study is the lack of clinically elevated antisocial personality disorders in the data pool.
The prisoner sample proved to be similar to the college sample in many different
categories and, thus, provided the research with little variance. This is a limitation
mainly because the lack of variance makes it difficult to predict just how those with
antisocial personality disorder will think about moral dilemmas.
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Though the sample included prisoners, the number of prisoners relative to the
number of college students was quite small. The initial sample was taken from a stateinmate facility, which only houses an average of 30 to 40 inmates. In addition, many of
the prisoners appeared to begin randomly responding to the measurements after a short
period of time. Collecting data from a larger source of incarcerated individuals may
create more opportunity for variance in future studies.
Another factor to consider in future studies is the administration time of the two
measurements. Although a relatively large amount of data was excluded from the final
pool due to a failure to pass reliability checks, a great deal of the prisoner data was
excluded simply due to a failure to complete the measurements. Hence, future efforts in
this direction may wish to reduce the administration time by using less time-consuming
measurements such as the short-format DIT, which requires participants to read and
respond to three rather than six dilemmas.
Another limitation may be related to the influence of DIT responding to the PAI.
After individuals spent a significant time reading and responding to a number of moral
scenarios, they may have been less likely to endorse PAI items related to Antisocial
behavior. In future studies, reversing the administration order or incorporating some
form of counterbalancing; (i.e., an unrelated survey to reset their style of thinking from
the DIT) may help to prevent this limitation.
Finally, the Cronbach’s alpha for the maintaining norms schema emerged lower
than expected. In consideration of the other two schema, which emerged as acceptable
figures, the lower maintaining norms Cronbach’s alpha likely represents the response
pattern from a number of participants who are transitioning towards or away from the
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maintaining schema and, thus, were responding inconsistently on items related to the
maintaining norms schema.
This study presents opportunities for pursuing research into a completely new
domain of how moral judgment develops. Future research should continue to develop
this topic with a variety of approaches. As with any study, it is important to create the
opportunity for as much variance in the data as possible. Thus, future research should
collect data from as many relevant populations as possible. Any prison, jail, or stateinmate facility is appropriate. It is also recommended that no age restrictions be placed
on future research. Gathering data from in-patient facilities that specialize in the
treatment of adolescents with behavioral disorders is likely to contribute to variance as
well.
The DIT should also continue to be the primary tool when measuring moral
judgment development in the future. Given the numerous research and validation studies
completed with the DIT, as well as the conclusions drawn in regard to its ability to
measure an individual’s level of moral thinking, the DIT continues to be a viable option
when measuring moral judgment. However, as a result of a significant level of attrition,
the short-form DIT should be considered in future studies with a similar administration
structure. This study addresses moral judgment; however, Rest et al. (1999a) indicate
that moral judgment is but one component of moral development. Future studies should
explore the possible relationship that antisocial personality factors may have with other
components including moral sensitivity, moral motivation, and moral
character/implementation. More flexibility can be exercised, however, when dealing
with personality characteristics.
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Although the PAI is a viable tool when measuring personality, there are a great
number of tools available when measuring personality characteristics and the possibility
of using others should not be ruled out. Should measurements such as the PAI be used
again, it may be practical to consider other Axis-II personality factors and their
relationship with moral judgment as well. Proper measures should also be put in place to
lower the number of excluded data as a result of a failure to pass reliability checks. Such
measures could include a short-form reliability check before the initial administration to
assess for any random responders or a contract in which participants agree to answer each
item honestly.
Finally, it is recommended that those investigating this topic in the future should
adjust the administration of the testing items accordingly when dealing with a population
such as state-inmates. Although the college participants were able to complete the
measurements in approximately an hour, the prisoner participants took between two to
three hours before completing or giving up on the study all together. As mentioned
above, the short-form DIT is an appropriate alternative. Also, administering items from
the PAI that only relate to antisocial personality factors may be a viable alternative to
administering the entire 344-item measurement.
Conclusion
Just as studies have linked prosocial characteristics to the development of moral
judgment (Damon & Hart, 1988; Lifton, 1985), this study supports that important
relationships exist between antisocial personality characteristics and aspects of moral
judgment. The purpose of this study was two-fold: to explore the possibility that
antisocial personality characteristics may a) result in a failure to advance in moral
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judgment development, and b) result in a failure to utilize one’s moral judgment ability.
This study’s findings did not support that antisocial personality characteristics can inhibit
moral judgment development. However, its findings indicate that antisocial personality
characteristics can pertain to one’s thinking when it comes to making moral decisions.
This is evidenced by the relationships seen with ANT subscales and DIT A and U scores
as well as the findings that those with elevated ANTE scores had a tendency to respond
on two scenarios (and potentially a third) in a way that could suggest self-serving motives.
Overall, this study does the duty of setting the foundation for new research and creating
the possibility for new hypotheses related to the study of moral judgment and its
development. This study therefore supports that the investigation of similar topics in the
future is warranted and a worthy pursuit.
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Demographic Questionnaire
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Demographics
1. Age: ______ years.
2. Gender (circle one):

Male

Female

3. Cumulative GPA: ______ 3.6 - 4.0
______ 3.1 - 3.5
______ 2.6 - 3.0
______ 2.1 - 2.5
______ below 2.1
4. ACT score: ________ or SAT Score : Total: _______ Verbal: ______
5. Number of semesters in college (including junior college): ______________
6. Education level:

______ Freshman
______ Sophomore
______ Junior
______ Senior
______ Other: ________________________

7. Ethnicity (optional):

______ African American/Black
______ American Indian or Alaska Native
______ Asian
______ Hispanic/Latino
______ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
______ White
______ Other: _____________________________
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Appendix D
Informed Consent Document (College Students)
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INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT (College Students)
Project Title: The relationship between personality and social decision making
Investigator: Nathan A. Kerr.
Psychology Department

270-535-2080

nathan.kerr@wku.edu
You are being asked to participate in a research project conducted through Western
Kentucky University. The University requires that you give your signed agreement to
participate.
The investigator will explain to you in detail the purpose of the research project, the
procedures to be used, and the potential benefits and possible risks of participation. You
may ask him/her any questions you have to help you understand the project. A basic
explanation of the project is written below. Please read this explanation and discuss with
the researcher any questions you may have.
If you then decide to participate in this research, please sign on the last page of this form
in the presence of the person who explained the project to you. You should be given a
copy of this form to keep. The information that follows details the parameters of this
research project:
1. Nature and Purpose of the Project: The purpose of this research project is to
address how specific personality factors may relate to social decision making.
2. Explanation of Procedures: Your participation in this study involves your
completion of three different questionnaires. The questionnaires to be completed ask
participants to report demographic information, information about their thoughts
about various social dilemmas and situations, and information about personality.
Completing these questionnaires will take about 95 minutes.
3. Discomfort and Risks: There is minimal or no risk to you in participating in this
study. This study involves some self-disclosure, and a commitment of your time is
also involved.
4. Benefits: Your participation in this research will contribute to psychological research
by helping to better understand how specific personality factors can relate to social
decision making.
5. Confidentiality: Answers and information obtained in this study will remain
anonymous and confidential and will be used solely for the purposes of this study.
Additionally, answers and information obtained will not be identifiable as your
specific answers. If you should become uncomfortable at any time, you have the
right to discontinue your participation, and your answers will be removed from the
study. You also have the option to refuse to answer any question and remain in the
study. Only group data will appear in any reports of this study.
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6. Refusal/Withdrawal: Refusal to participate in this study in full or in part will have
no effect on any future services you may be entitled to from the University. Anyone
who agrees to participate is free to withdraw from the study at any time.

If you have read and understand the parameters of this study and wish to participate,
please sign below after reading the following statement:
I understand the conditions set forth above, and I agree to participate in this study. I
also understand that it is not possible to identify all potential risks in an experimental
procedure and believe that reasonable safeguards have been taken to minimize both the
known and potential but unknown risks.
__________________________________________
Signature of Participant
__________________________________________
Witness

_______________
Date
_______________
Date

THE DATED APPROVAL ON THIS CONSENT FORM INDICATES THAT
THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY
THE WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW BOARD
Dr. Phillip E. Myers, Human Protections Administrator
TELEPHONE: (270) 745-4652
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Appendix E
Informed Consent Document (Prisoners)
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INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT (Prisoners)
Project Title: The relationship between personality and social decision making
Investigator: Nathan A. Kerr.
Psychology Department

270-535-2080

nathan.kerr@wku.edu
You are being asked to join in a research project made by Western Kentucky
University. Before taking part of this study, the University will ask you to sign your
name in agreement.
The investigator will tell you what this project is for, what you will be doing, how
this project helps, and if there is any risk for you. You are welcome to ask him/her any
questions you have to help you understand the project. A simple explanation of the
project is written below. Please read this explanation and talk with the researcher about
any questions you may have.
If you then choose that you want to be in this project, please sign on the last page
of this form in front of the person who explained the project to you. You should be given
a copy of this form to keep. The information below talks about this research project:
1. Nature and Purpose of the Project: The idea of this project is to look at how
someone’s personality may relate to their decisions in a social setting.
2. Explanation of Procedures: To be a part of this study, you will need to complete
three different surveys. The questionnaires to be completed ask participants to report
background information, information about their thoughts about various social
situations, and information about personality. Completing these questionnaires will
take about 95 minutes.
3. Discomfort and Risks: There is little to no risk to you being a part of this study.
This study will ask you to reveal some of your personal information, and a
commitment of your time is also involved.
4. Benefits: Your presence in this research will help lead to a better understanding of
how people’s personality can relate to their decisions in social settings.
5. Confidentiality: Answers and information that we get in this study will be kept
secret and will be used only for the purposes of this study. Also, answers and
information obtained will not be seen as your specific answers. If you should feel
uncomfortable at any time, you have the right to stop your participation, and your
answers will be removed from the study. You also have the option to refuse to
answer any question and remain in the study. Only group data will appear in any
reports of this study.
6. Refusal/Withdrawal: Deciding to not participate in this study in full or in part will
not keep you from any future services offered from the University. Anyone who
agrees to be a part of this study is free to withdraw from the study at any time.
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If you have read and understand the risks and benefits of this study and wish to
participate, please sign below after reading the following statement:
I understand the purpose of this study, and I agree to participate. I also understand that
it is not possible to identify all of the possible risks and believe that efforts have been
taken to lower the chances of any risks.
__________________________________________
Signature of Participant
__________________________________________
Witness

_______________
Date
_______________
Date

THE DATED APPROVAL ON THIS CONSENT FORM INDICATES THAT
THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY
THE WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW BOARD
Dr. Phillip E. Myers, Human Protections Administrator
TELEPHONE: (270) 745-4652
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